Friday, April 25th, 2008

[BRIEF NOTE] The Slavs are coming! The Slavs are coming!

Not too long ago, Expatica carried the news that Slovaks were moving in large numbers to Austria. These Slovaks aren't the typical (or rather, stereotypical) migrants to rich western Europe, however.

When the Iron Curtain between the then Czechoslovakia and Austria tumbled 18 years ago, residents of the grey, run-down and impoverished Bratislava crossed the nearby border, just 7 kilometres away, in search of jobs and western goods in better-off Austria.

Now the Slovaks are scouting Austria's border region in search of land or houses, which are substantially cheaper here than in booming Bratislava.

Three years ago Miriam's Slovak-Canadian husband Daniel Soska, 39, a regional sales director in a telecoms company, was one of them.

"If we wanted to have the same land 7 kilometres from downtown Bratislava on the Slovak side we would have to pay at least four times more per square metre," he said.

[. . .]

The expansion of the borderless Schengen area on December 21 will bring Wolfsthal even closer to the Slovak capital than it has been for 90 years - since the time when Bratislava, known then in German as Pressburg, belonged to the Habsburg Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

The village's population has been shrinking since the monarchy disintegrated into nation states after World War I and a border between Austria and the nascent Czechoslovakia emerged in its backyard.

In the years after World War II, the Iron Curtain came and a once-busy imperial tram line between Bratislava and Vienna, which passed through Wolfsthal, finally ceased to run. The village faded from a stop on a busy artery into a declining station in the middle of nowhere.

"This used to be the end of the world," said the 45-year-old Schoedinger, a former policeman whose entire life has been linked to the border. "I've witnessed everything that happened here," he added.

[. . .]

The village of 250 weekend inhabitants and 800 permanent residents, 40 per cent of whom are now under the age of 30, saw a rise in its population for the first time in 2001, the mayor said.

Schoedinger has been in talks with Bratislava's public-transport authorities so a regular bus line could start running between the city and his hometown as soon as the border controls disappear.

"Now we have a future," the beaming mayor said. "We live in a region between Bratislava and Vienna. That's what is important, not which passport we carry."


This migration is an interesting revisiting of the last years of Austria-Hungary, where German nationalists were concerned about the influx of Czechs into Vienna and surrounding regions. That the regions making up Vienna had long been destinations for migrants really didn't enter into the minds of these people, and the later experiences of the Cold War helped efface the memories of this movements across the Austrian state frontier.

Much the same can be true about the immigration of Poles to eastern Germany, which is picking up again in the same unexpected way as on the Austrian-Slovak frontier.

When Daniel Sosin was looking to buy a house for his family in the north-western Polish city of Szczecin he was aghast at how little he would get for his money. So he went looking across the nearby border with Germany, buying a 150-year-old house in the village of Penkun for about the same price as a bachelor flat in Szczecin.

"Poland is an unkempt country and I don't want to live like that," says Mr Sosin, an architect, sitting in his house overlooking a cobbled street in the heart of the village. "I want to live in a beautiful area. It will take Poland generations to get to the same level as here."

Mr Sosin is part of a wider trend as people from the new EU member states, often flush with cash from real estate booms in their home countries, are beginning to buy properties in nearby "old" EU states to the west. Penkun is in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, one of Germany's most economically depressed areas. Thousands of young people have left for better prospects in the west, leaving behind empty houses and apartments that are being snapped up by Poles.

"We have a few dozen calls a day," says Mariola Dadun, owner of the A do Z real estate agency in Szczecin. "There are three reasons people are interested in Germany: prices, prices, prices."

[. . .]

In eastern Germany prices are also rising thanks to the arrival of the Poles. "Before Poland's entry into the EU there was depopulation here - a lot of houses were abandoned and there was no real estate market at all. The early pioneers who bought a few years ago were able to pick up houses for very little but prices have risen since then," says Jan Rybski, a property developer in Löcknitz, a German village 25km from Szczecin. "But even if land prices are becoming similar, you still get a lot better quality and infrastructure in Germany than in Poland."

Lothar Meistring, Löcknitz's mayor, is upbeat about the new Polish residents. Over 200 Poles live in the village and a further 400 in the immediate region. He says many have bought and renovated old properties or purchased land to build houses. "In many neighbouring areas they have to pull down houses because they are disused, as people move away. Here, it's the opposite - we are building new places."


Polish migration to Germany can be said to have begun in the late 19th century with the Ostflucht, the movement of Poles but especially Germans from the eastern provinces of Prussia to other regions of Germany and to overseas destinations. This co-existed with a long-standing migration of Poles deeper into Germany, whether from Prussian, Austrian, or Russian Poland, as industrial or agricultural labourers, most famously as the Ruhr Poles. In the April 2001 Sarmatian review, Malgorzata Warchol-Schlottmann described ("Polonia in Germany") a complicated Polish-origin community in Germany, with the descendants of pre-Second World War migrants from Poland mixing with economic migrants and with Polish emigrants possessing self-identified German ancestry. This latest migration, of well-heeled Poles looking for cheap real estate on the German side of the border, is as unprecedented as the Slovak migration to adjacent villages in Austria.

The change, however, is only to be expected. Eurostat's 2002 survey of regional GDP per capita suggests that Bratislava, at 112% of the EU25 average, more than holds its own against poorer areas in eastern and southern Austria. Western Poland is still behind most of eastern Germany, but the gap isn't that big and--given the relatively higher growth rates in Poland--might close still further. In the meantime, the absolutely larger number of Poles ensures that at least a few Poles will be in a position to take advantage of cheap East German land.

It's a bit heartwarming to see that cross-border life in the east of the European Union is taking on the character of cross-border life elsewhere in the European Union, in a way akin to the community that once existed wholly intact on the Canadian-American border until recently. It's also interesting to note the ways in which these patterns of cross-border life have shifted, ever not so subtly, from pre-Cold War patterns.
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Thursday, April 24th, 2008

[BRIEF NOTE] Those damned transnational regions!

Strange Maps has a couple of posts (1, 2) on the belief, among certain elements of the British right, that the European Union plans to partitioning the islands into Trans-Manche, Atlantic, and North Sea regions. (On both maps, parts of the British midlands are left clear. Perhaps that will be the reserve of the English?)

The misreading seems to rest on the false assumption that the sub-national regionalism and transnational regionalism promoted, occasionally, by the European Union, is capable of threatening the integrity of established nation-states. Given the relatively few powers that many of these regions have and the indifference with which these are used and their attachments to their national states, that's more than a bit laughable. The Czechs have kept their part of Silesia free from Poland; the Hungarians haven't conquered Transylvania; Estonia and Finland haven't been merged; the Franco-Spanish borders haven't fused to constitute a sort of Occitano-Catalan state. Scottish, Catalonian, and Flemish secessionists might enthusiastically use these instruments of regionalism, but no one in Brussels is ordering them to secede. Really.

All that reminds me of what might, or might not, be an interesting lacuna in North America. In books like Joel Garreau's Nine Nations of North America, a variety of transnational regions based on common cultural, economic, and political factors are described in detail. This experience is a lived experience on the ground--in the Great Lakes Basin region, for instance, Ontario often compares itself with Michigan, upstate new York, or even Ohio. And yet, there aren't that many transnational regions that I know of in North America is Atlantica, including New England and Atlantic Canada.

Am I missing a cluster of transnational regions? Or are North Americans really not that sociable across their national frontiers?
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Wednesday, April 23rd, 2008

[LINK] More thoughts on Greater Albania

This post's title refers Greater Albania as a cultural region, rather than to a (very unlikely) unified state. Doug Muir has another post at A Fistful of Euros examining the "Albanosphere," describing the community's heartland in brief. It's poor and backwards but catching up rapidly to the rest of the Balkans and Europe, it's culturally conservative but religiously tolerant, its culture is clannish and is unfortunate enough to have a venal political class, and Albanians have a poor reputation in Europe but at the same time are on Europe's doorstep.
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Thursday, March 13th, 2008

[LINK] "From Francafrique to Eurafrique with Sarkozy: Not Much of a Difference?"

I'm normally skeptical of the motivations of Turkish sources critical of France ever since Franco-Turkish relations broke down after France's recognition of the Armenian genocide earlier this decade, but Caglar Dolek's quite readable "From Francafrique to Eurafrique with Sarkozy: Not Much of a Difference?", published in the Journal of Turkish Weekly, does make good points about Sarkozy's Mediterranean Union plan. Dolek argues that, via the European Union, France is trying to move on from the nominally and cronyishpost-colonial web of ecionomic, political and military contacts known as "Francafrique" by bringing in the entire European Union into a much closer relationship the entire African continent, not only the Francophone countries.

After reading Nicholas Shaxson's Poisoned Wells, I'm quite willing to agree with Dolek that French motivations are far from pure and that this would add quite a few negatives, like substantial corruption and seret networks of powerful people, to the broader European political arena.. I also think that the realization of something like this plan is inevitable, if only because of the potential economic synergy between the two shores of the Mediterranean. At least the North African states like Morocco and Tunisia that have a passing chance of joining the European Union have a chance at avoiding the worst of this arrangement.
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Wednesday, March 12th, 2008

[BRIEF NOTE] The desperate emigrants of Senegal

A while ago, I came across an article originally from Agence France-Presse that explored the mechanics of illegal emigration from Senegal. It makes for compelling reading.

Because of the clandestine nature of the business, it is not known how many migrants are processed or how many fishing boats set sail from Elinkine, nestled in the deep mangroves on the mouth of the Casamance River, in Senegal's southern province of the same name.

But what is certain is that it is a key departure point for west African illegal emigrants trying to cross the Atlantic Ocean to the so-called European Eldorado and that a network of smugglers are raking a fortune from the trade.

"Here everybody benefits, that is why people are careful," says Alioune who identifies himself by a pseudonym.

Residents of this tiny, leafy village are very cagey when it comes to talking about the booming trade that has prospered in recent years, from desperately poor Africans who exhaust their family's meagre resources for the risky 1,000-plus kilometre-long (625-plus miles) trip on high seas in ramshackle fishing boats.

When and if they talk, they neither give their full names nor details for fear of upsetting the system.

Boat owners and smugglers are directly involved in the trafficking, as are fishermen enlisted to sail the pirogues.

Along a sandy village street, a ferryman sitting on his veranda who gives his name as Joseph says that he is aware that he is on a police wanted list.

"We can make lots of money, but a lot of smugglers have been arrested," he said before dodging away.

According to Alioune, an average two boats set sail from Elinkine aiming for the Spanish Canary Islands every week, but it is generally not a subject of open discussion because "it is a very dangerous game" that concerns the entire village.

Some homes around the village serve as "lodges" where days before takeoff, the prospective migrants are gathered and prepared for the trip.

"Everybody is well aware and most of the people are involved. It comes with lots of money, it's a mafia here," added Alioune. Boats owners have created what he called a commission that "facilitates" the departures, he said.

Each boat owner contributes an annual fee to this commission of three million CFA francs (4,500 euros, 6,600 dollars) "and in return the departures are facilitated and the police get their share," he said.


Senegal is an African country that has been profoundly influenced by Europe. In the modern era, France's Senegalese colony was transformed by the 1848 revolution in France, which abandoned slavery and made inhabitants of the city of Dakar French citizens. Dakar remained a regional capital during the period of French empire in Africa. By the First World War, as Barbara Jettinger's Senegal country study (PDF format) points out, many Senegalese were heading to the metropole.

The first wave of out-migration to Europe took place during the First World War, when many Senegalese worked in France as infantrymen (“tirailleurs” in French) (Guèye 2002: 284; Robinson 1991: 166). After Senegal gained independence from France in 1960, an increasing number of Senegalese left for France and settled in Paris and the main industrial centres such as Marseille. These migrants are mainly Soninké, Sereer and Tukulëë (Timera 1996) who lived primarily in the Senegal River valley regions. They were attracted by the European economic boom, and their out-migration was mainly supported by their families and facilitated by the fact that all Senegalese citizens at the time had both Senegalese and French citizenship. This structural affiliation to France continued for more than 20 years after Senegal’s independence (Garson 1992: 84–85). The out-migration of Senegalese citizens to France increased from 5,688 in 1968 to 32,350 in 1982 (INSEE 2004). Growing mass migration was also a response to the persistent drought as well as economic and politicalpressure on Senegal from the international community. For example, one of the major economic problems with deep social repercussions was the devaluation of the Franc CFA in 1994, which precipitated a harsh social crisis, particularly in the cities. The devaluation halved purchasing power, and resulted in price increases of 25–30 per cent for basic food stuffs such as rice. The high price of food had far-reaching effects on all social classes (Sane 1998; Vengroff and Creevey 1997). Thus, the deep economic and social crisis Senegal was facing induced more and more Senegalese from all social strata and ethnic and religious groups to migrate. Internally migrants went to the capital city Dakar; internationally, destinations included not only to France, but also new countries, such as Spain, Italy, Germany and beyond Europe to the USA, thereby shaping a new transnational space (see Guèye 2002, 2003; Robin 1997; Tall 2002).


More Jettinger )

Unfortunately for these emigrants, as noted elsewhere, the closing down of liberal immigration regimes in most of Europe has encouraged desperate Senegalese to take the tremendous risks of illegal migration via the rickety boats of Elinkine and other Senegalese ports in order to secure a living wage for themselves and their dependents.
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Tuesday, February 12th, 2008

[DM] "The demographics of bad politics"

I've a post up at Demography Matters exploring the interaction between certain brands of conservatism and apocalyptic fantasies about Europe, particularly of the family-hostile continent's demographic collapse and he flipside of Eurabia. Comments, here or there, are most welcome.

(Yes, I expanded upon this post.)
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Thursday, February 7th, 2008

[FISKING] A brief look at Mitt Romney

I was so struck by the BBC report of the content of Mitt Romney's concession speech, delivered topday at the Conservative Political Action Conference, that I Googled the Associated Press-sanctioned speech transcript. It's interesting. After saying that "unless America changes course, we could become the France of the 21st century," he goes on to talk about Europe and population.

Europe -- Europe is facing a demographic disaster.

ROMNEY: That's the inevitable product of weakened faith in the Creator, failed families, disrespect for the sanctity of human life, and eroded morality.

Some reason that culture is merely an accessory to America's vitality. We know that it's the source of our strength. And we will not be dissuaded by the snickers and knowing glances when we stand up for family values and morality and culture. We will...

(APPLAUSE)

Conservatives here and conservatives across the country will always be honored to stand on principle and to stand for principles.


1. The casual slam at France is unsurprising. It's equally unsurprising that a politically unified and internally integrated demi-continent of three hundred million people that has been spared the direct ravages of war could be more powerful than a country with a fifth the population and less than a tenth of the land area. Oh well. Maybe Romney's just bitter that he made two converts during his two-and-a-half years in France as a Mormon missionary.

2. The "China and India will dominate us" meme is amusing, given the United States' aforementioned size, its very significant economic lead in per capita terms over those two countries, and the meme's tacit assumption that economic growth in these two countries will continue in the high single digits for the next two decades. If. Anyway, all this assumes that anything can break the unstoppable dominance of the Japanese.

3. It's really annoying how so many conservatives have felt free to take the word "family" and limit it to only the sorts of families that they want. In any case, to the extent that there are demographic issues in Europe, countries like Italy where traditional families are strong aren't faring nearly as well as countries like France where, at latest report, 43% of children are born out of wedlock.

I could go into more detail, but I won't bother. Why should I devote more time to political losers if I have better things to do?
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Friday, December 28th, 2007

[BRIEF NOTE] Belgium's Germanophones

Belgian's electoral crisis has been solved for now with a new government, though the underlying tensions between the Netherlandophone Flemish and Francophones in Wallonia seems set to explode into confrontation sooner or later. Perhaps it will be over Francophone migration to Brussels' nominally Netherlandophone suburbs, or it might be that Miss Belgum's inability to speak Dutch will be the trigger.. One group of Belgians most notable for its absence from the past year's crisis are the seventy thousand or so Germanophones of Belgium, concentrated in a few territories in eastern Belgium and described--as in Reuters' November ""Achtung?" -- Belgium's German-speakers pipe up" and Le Monde's more recent "Les germanophones, des Belges heureux" ("The Germanophones, the happy Belgians")--as a satisfied minority perplexed by its fate in the case of a Belgian breakup. Says Reuters:

At a parade in the mostly German-speaking town of Eupen on November 11 to honor Saint Martin, the patron of generosity who shared his coat with a beggar, the carnival mood was tinged with concern and rare shows of patriotism.

As children and brass bands paraded towards a giant bonfire in one of the main town squares, Belgian flags were -- unusually -- displayed on windows, and painted on some people's cheeks.

"It's always about the Dutch and the French-speaking communities and I'm a little disappointed that they don't even talk about us," said Henri Sparla, a senior citizen.

To date the German-speaking community -- most of whom are tucked into the east of the French-speaking region of Wallonia -- has been served well by Belgium's political system of compromises between 6.5 million Dutch-speakers and 4 million francophones.

The kingdom recognizes German as one of its three official languages, the community has its own parliament and education system, and the European Union has described Belgium's German-speakers as one of Europe's most pampered minorities.

[. . .]

"What makes Belgium is that we speak different languages," said Katerin Bauer, a 24 year-old scout leader. "The Flemish don't consider themselves Dutch, the French-speaking don't consider themselves as French and we are not German."

As children followed tradition to walk through the streets singing songs and carrying paper lanterns, some of the German-speaking adults wondered what they would do if Belgium were no more.

"I wouldn't know where I belong anymore. I speak German and live in Wallonia, where shall I go to? To France, Germany, Luxembourg? I would lose my attachment to what I call home," said father Michael Kempen as his children gathered around the traditional bonfire.


Some German dialect speakers were included on the wrong side of the Germanic-Romance language frontier within the Belgian provinces of Luxembourg and Limburg in 1839, but most of Belgium's Germanophones are live in Eupen-Malmedy. Formerly a territory of Prussia's Rhine Province, after the First World War Eupen-Malmedy was ceded to Belgium and, apart from an interlude in 1940-1945, has remained Belgian ever since. After a period of Belgian repression, from the 1950s onwards Belgian Germanophones eventually came to enjoy the same government policies of cultural decentralization and self-rule as Belgium's two dominant language groups. The modern institutionalized German-speaking community of Belgium seems to have succeeded in preserving the German language in Belgium, as described in Mercator's analysis of that language's position.

What would happen to this minority in the event of Belgium exploding, I wonder? The Le Monde article seems to suggest that independence might be the least unpopular choice, given a reluctance to join Germany and the potential unattractiveness of a continued alignment with an independent Wallonia. The idea of Eupen-Malmedy becoming a European Union member-state does have a certain Grand Fenwick appeal to it, but ...
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Friday, November 9th, 2007

[LINK] Some Friday Links


  • Richard at 1948 links to Avi Klein's Washington Monthly article "Publish and Perish", about Lyndon LaRouche's travails now that his publisher has killed himself.

  • Phil Hunt at Amused Cynicism writes against the idea of school uniforms.

  • Matthew Hogan at 'Aqoul points out that an American strategy towards the Middle East that's based on the writings of Bernard "Europe is going to be an annex of the Maghreb" Lewis and Samuel "Let's prepare for the clash of civilizations" Huntington has the potential to backfire dramatically.

  • Boing Boing links to an image of a new statue, a Barbie frozen in carbonite.

  • Aziz Poonwalla at City of Brass has two posts up (1, 2) about the ongoing crisis in Pakistan.

  • Ingrid Robeyns at Crooked Timber writes about how, after 150 days, Belgium is still without a national government.

  • Will Baird at The Dragon's Tales has a fascinating post exploring the possible causes of several unexplained mass extinctions in Earth's history.

  • A Fistful of Euros' Alex Harrowell observes that one consequence of the Italian backlash against Romanian immigrants is the collapse of the far-right Identity-Tradition-Sovereignty coalition in the European Parliament. It turns out that the Greater Romania Party doesn't like the fact that the leader of Italy's post-fascists has been calling Romanians animals.

  • Russell Arben Fox writes about the Barenaked Ladies' 1992 song "If I Had A Million Dollars," calling it "the quintessentially Canadian song: not quite this, and not quite that, but pretty damn funny and decent all the same, in a low key sort of way." On behalf of Canadians, thanks!

  • Norman Geras writes about the Imposter Syndrome as experienced by academics.

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Friday, September 14th, 2007

[REVIEW] Adam Tooze, The Wages of Destruction

Alex Harrowell's review, at A Fistful of Euros, of Adam Tooze's The Wages of Destruction, is a must-read review of a must-read book aboiut the vissicitudes of the German economy under Naziism.

Tooze provides abundant evidence for his argument that Germany in the 1920s and 1930s, far from being a uniquely advanced economy full of V-2s and Volkswagens, actually lagged behind its competitors. The vast Fordist demi-continent of the United States was for many Germans, an obvious competitor and model, but so were Britain and France, with their vast empires, their high wages, and their relatively abundant agricultural land. Germany, in Tooze's convincing depiction, was a country with an economy that saw little to no net growth over the two decades that followed the First World War, with an urban working class that could barely afford to sustain itself and a peasantry forced to subsist on overcrowded land and little prospect of this changing. One response to the interwar conundrum--the respone, Tooze notes, that West Germany took after the Second World War--would have been for Germany to try to integrate itself into an integrated world and European economy, but the unsettled and unsettling tone of politics in interwar Europe kept that from being fulfilled. Harrowell points out that the Nazis responded by wanting to "shake the structure until it fell down; the economic history of the 30s in Germany is one of continuous foreign exchange crises, mitigated by a succession of increasingly inconsistent expedients." Indeed, "[b]y 1939, the Reichsbank was reduced to commissioning secret studies to estimate the mark’s exchange rate; the economists who carried them out concluded that the concept was now meaningless in the light of dozens of mutually incompatible side-deals with Germany’s trading partners."

The German economy fared worse in the Second World War. Nazi Germany's economic policy-making, rather than advancing beyond sustained inconsistently, devolved to the point of the wholesale pillage of conquered and satellite states. The sort of willing pan-European collaboration that could have made a difference, Tooze points out, was short-circuited not only by Nazi Germany's inability to treat other polities as its equals but by the economical unsustainability of a Europe deprived of extra-European trade. In the end, it all came crashing down.

Tooze's economic history is gripping, not only because it's an economic history that presents compelling arguments but because of its insights into Nazism. As the debate over at J. Bradford Delong's blog suggests, the long-standing debate as to whether the Holocaust and other Nazi atrocities were planned by the Nazis in advance (intentionalism) or came about as an epiphenomenon of other Nazi policies (functionalism) seems to have been settled in favour of the intentionalists: An interwar Germany without Nazism might well have gone to war against most of Europe with the aim of securing economic hegemony, but without Nazism's influence on German policy-making (Heather Pringle's The Master Plan, among other books, provides an overview of some of Nazism's inherent irrationality) it seems quite unlikely whether a Nazi-less Germany would ever have come up with such manifestly counterproductive schemes as liquidating the populations of eastern Europe. Too, as Harrowell points out, images of the Americans' settlement of the west of their country and Britain's empire featured prominently as models for Germany's feature imperium, suggesting that Hannah Arendt was quite right to identify intimate links between 19th century European imperialisms and 20th century European wars and genocides. (Mamdami also seems to have been wrong to argue in his When Victims Become Killers that the Nazi Germany did not perceive itself to be a colonizing power in eastern Europe.)

Compelling, well-written, innovative, certainly a classic, The Wages of Destruction must be read by anyone interested in the economics of Nazism and interwar Europe. Tooze deserves a thank-you.
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Saturday, August 25th, 2007

[LINK] The Financial Times on EU Muslims

The Financial Times has an ongoing series of articles examining MUslims in Europe, particularly Muslims in the European Union. Two articles in this series are of note.



Jytte Klausen, a professor of politics at Brandeis University who studies European Muslims, says: “It’s being advocated by people who don’t consult the numbers. All these claims are really emotional claims.” Sometimes they are made by Muslim or far-right groups, who share an interest in exaggerating the numbers.

Nominal Muslims – whether religious or not – account for 3-4 per cent of the European Union’s total population of 493m. Their percentage should rise, but far more modestly than the extreme predictions. That is chiefly because Muslims, both in Europe and the main “emigrating countries” of Turkey and north Africa, are having fewer babies.

“Nobody knows how many Muslims there are in Europe,” says Ms Klausen. Few European states ask citizens about religious beliefs. Estimates based on national origins suggest that 16m nominal Muslims live in the EU. There are about 5m in France, 3.3m in Germany and 1.5m-2m in the UK.

“Berlin is a Muslim city, Paris is a Muslim city, and even Madrid or Turin to some degree,” Jocelyn Cesari, an expert on European Muslims at Harvard University, has said.

The EU’s most Islamic country is Bulgaria, where 1m Muslims account for about one-seventh of the population.

But the birth-rates of Europe’s Muslim immigrants, though still above the EU’s average, are falling. The fertility rate of north African women in France has been dropping since 1981, say Jonathan Laurence and Justin Vaisse in their book Integrating Islam. “The longer immigrant women live in France, the fewer children they have; their fertility rate approaches that of native-born French women.”

At the last count Algerian women living in France averaged an estimated 2.57 children, against 1.94 for French women overall.

The decline in birth-rates is more dramatic in north Africa itself. Women there use contraceptives more and have babies later than they did. In Algeria and Morocco 35 years ago, the average woman had seven children. According to the United Nations, it is now 2.5 in Algeria (about the same as Turkey), 2.8 in Morocco, and falling in all of them. The US Central Intelligence Agency’s World Factbook has even lower estimates of Algerian, Tunisian and Turkish birth-rates: below France’s rate and below the replacement level of 2.1 children per woman. Emigrating countries are no longer exporting high birth rates to Europe.




An overwhelming majority of French people regard Muslim immigrants as French, see them as suitable marriage partners for children and do not consider them threats to security. This may seem surprising less than two years after the riots in French suburbs and three years after France banned Muslim headscarves from schools.

But Patrick Simon, a demographer at Ined demographic institute in Paris, said the riots of November 2005 had not been Islamist revolts against France. Rather, the main grievances were economic and against the police. “There was a social motor, not a religious motor,” he said.

Fewer than a quarter of Spaniards saw the presence of Muslims as a threat to national security or thought Muslims had too much political power. Only a fifth said they would object to their child marrying a Muslim.

The US prides itself on integrating immigrants more successfully than European countries. However, 40 per cent of Americans with children said they would object to their children marrying Muslims. Mr Bleich suggested this might be because more Americans than Europeans belonged to churches. “If you asked someone in an evangelical church, ‘Would you object if your child married a Catholic?’ you might get quite high numbers too.”

A third of Italians and Germans, and 46 per cent of Britons felt Muslims had too much political power. Of the British figure, Mr Bleich said: “That radically over- estimates the amount of power Muslims have.” Only four of 646 members of parliament are Muslims, and Muslims had failed to change Britain’s Iraq policy.

The poll’s methodology weighted the sample for factors such as age and gender but not for religious belief, and the number of self-declared Muslim respondents appears low. In France, Muslims are thought to represent 8-9 per cent of the population. In Germany and the UK, the figure is closer to 3-4 per cent. But self-declared Muslims represented only 1 per cent of the respondents in these three countries.
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Tuesday, December 19th, 2006

[BRIEF NOTE] On Kaliningrad

Last June, I wrote briefly about the vissicitudes of identity in the region of the East Prussia, stretching along the southeastern coast of the Baltic Sea from Danzig to Klaipeda, in the several generations since the 1945 expulsion of the region's German population and its resettlement by (from south to north) Poles, Russians, and Lithuanians. The central area of East Prussia, a knot of territory surrounding the region's capital once known as Königsberg, now constitutes the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad Oblast, home to nearly one million people separated from the Russian metropole by Lithuania and Belarus.

Justin Walley recent article in The Baltic Times, "The Russian soul, detached", is an interesting travelogue describing his experiences of that province. The area's remoteness from the European Union that surrounds it is what first strikes him:

Finding reliable background information about Kaliningrad in a time of mass global communication is strikingly difficult. In fact there are seemingly more English-language Web sites devoted to clam diving than there are to this tiny Russian exclave. A “Kaliningrad” word search on the Internet brings up news agency reports of smuggling, an AIDS epidemic, spying, and of an Su-27 fighter plane crashing in Lithuania en route to one of the exclave’s secretive military bases.

When I told some Latvians that I was going to Kaliningrad on holiday they reacted as if I'd just told them I wanted to spend a few days participating in a reality show where I would be incarcerated on a prison island. Most of my British friends think Kaliningrad is somewhere between Yekaterinburg and Novosibirsk in the middle of deepest, darkest Siberia.


Walley's overall impression of Kaliningrad seems to be a generally positive one, though modified by a sense of the region's relative emptiness. Though it is likely unfair to characterize Kaliningrad as a "black hole" in the middle of Europe, it is safe to say that without a particularly privileged position in the Russian and European economies, and suffering from a certain amount of isolation, Kaliningrad's prospects are at best mixed. Kaliningrad independence or radical autonomy is unlikely because of the central government's concerns for the integrity of the Russian state and the Russian identity of the people who now live there. European policies seem to balance the fine line between trying to engage with Kaliningrad separately and trying to prevent the territory's insertion into Europe as a source of migrants, disease, and other perceived ills from the rest of Russia.
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