Strange Maps has a couple of posts (1, 2) on the belief, among certain elements of the British right, that the European Union plans to partitioning the islands into Trans-Manche, Atlantic, and North Sea regions. (On both maps, parts of the British midlands are left clear. Perhaps that will be the reserve of the English?)

The misreading seems to rest on the false assumption that the sub-national regionalism and transnational regionalism promoted, occasionally, by the European Union, is capable of threatening the integrity of established nation-states. Given the relatively few powers that many of these regions have and the indifference with which these are used and their attachments to their national states, that's more than a bit laughable. The Czechs have kept their part of Silesia free from Poland; the Hungarians haven't conquered Transylvania; Estonia and Finland haven't been merged; the Franco-Spanish borders haven't fused to constitute a sort of Occitano-Catalan state. Scottish, Catalonian, and Flemish secessionists might enthusiastically use these instruments of regionalism, but no one in Brussels is ordering them to secede. Really.

All that reminds me of what might, or might not, be an interesting lacuna in North America. In books like Joel Garreau's Nine Nations of North America, a variety of transnational regions based on common cultural, economic, and political factors are described in detail. This experience is a lived experience on the ground--in the Great Lakes Basin region, for instance, Ontario often compares itself with Michigan, upstate new York, or even Ohio. And yet, there aren't that many transnational regions that I know of in North America is Atlantica, including New England and Atlantic Canada.

Am I missing a cluster of transnational regions? Or are North Americans really not that sociable across their national frontiers?

Henry Farrell at Crooked Timber has a post exploring the interesting new politics of the opposition to the Beijing Olympics. The boycotts of the 1980 Moscow Olympics and the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics were driven by interstate rivalries, but the ongoing mass protests about the Beijing Olympics are driven by what looks to be a mobilized civil society. As he concludes, "we are seeing how public opinion and organized cross-national opposition can create significant constraints on the ability of leaders to respond to what they see as the geostrategic necessity of keeping China happy."

I'm normally skeptical of the motivations of Turkish sources critical of France ever since Franco-Turkish relations broke down after France's recognition of the Armenian genocide earlier this decade, but Caglar Dolek's quite readable "From Francafrique to Eurafrique with Sarkozy: Not Much of a Difference?", published in the Journal of Turkish Weekly, does make good points about Sarkozy's Mediterranean Union plan. Dolek argues that, via the European Union, France is trying to move on from the nominally and cronyishpost-colonial web of ecionomic, political and military contacts known as "Francafrique" by bringing in the entire European Union into a much closer relationship the entire African continent, not only the Francophone countries.

After reading Nicholas Shaxson's Poisoned Wells, I'm quite willing to agree with Dolek that French motivations are far from pure and that this would add quite a few negatives, like substantial corruption and seret networks of powerful people, to the broader European political arena.. I also think that the realization of something like this plan is inevitable, if only because of the potential economic synergy between the two shores of the Mediterranean. At least the North African states like Morocco and Tunisia that have a passing chance of joining the European Union have a chance at avoiding the worst of this arrangement.

After I learned of American discontent with NAFTA, I was a bit surprised to learn via the Canadian press that not only did Obama's economics advisor tell the Canadian consul-general that his NAFTA rhetoric was just for show, but that this indiscretion cost him three of the four states up for grabs ("NAFTA meeting 'misreported'- Obama"). Of course, he's not at fault.

Blame Canada!

Just like the animated characters on South Park, Barack Obama insisted Wednesday that Canadian officials "misreported" details of a meeting with his senior economic adviser now being cited as a key reason he lost Ohio's Democratic presidential primary to Hillary Clinton.

Regrouping after losing three of four nominating contests Tuesday to Clinton, Obama maintained his campaign was not at fault in the "Nafta-gate" controversy and insisted he had no plans to fire economist Austan Goolsbee for his role in the affair.

He's an economist. He's not a politician. So, I think, you know, he's not familiar with how these things get distorted," Obama said in an interview Wednesday with Fox News Channel.

"I'm not going to punish someone for making a innocent decision like that."

Goolsbee got caught in a political maelstrom last week after it emerged he met privately Feb. 8 with Georges Rioux, Canada's consul general in Chicago, and discussed Obama's views on the North American Free Trade Agreement.

In a memo leaked to the media last weekend, Canadian diplomats reported Goolsbee said Obama's tough talk on Nafta should be viewed more as "political positioning than a clear articulation of policy plans."

He also reportedly told the Canadians that Obama's protectionist language on Nafta was "more reflective of the political manoeuvring than policy."

Clinton seized on the reports and accused Obama of employing a "wink-wink" strategy - saying one thing about Nafta to voters in economically depressed Ohio, and another to foreign governments.

Exit polls showed a sharp swing of support to Clinton in the final three days before voting, at the height of the publicity surrounding the controversy.

An investigation of the origins of the leak is ongoing, some blaming Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper's chief of staff. Harper did say that the leak was "blatantly unfair" to Obama and quite possibly illegal, but I wouldn't risk betting on whether anything will come for this up in Canada. What I will say is that I think it's fitting that Obama be called up on his politicians' rhetoric, by the often-dismissed Canadian press no less. Voters have gotten a chance to find out that the man who positions himself as being an idealist has turned out to be just as much of a crass politician as the next person.

I am also peeved that Obama's concern for ethical behaviour in public life doesn't extend to auslander like us Canadians. Under Bush, the United States has been reluctant to obey the tribunals created under NAFTA, even though NAFTA--like its successor trade deals--was tilted strongly towards the United States and has contributed to a restructuring of the Canadian economy that has left us much more dependent on the United States. Bush is just one president, hoped to be an anomaly, but if someone like Obama is willing to at least sound as if he'd behave in an even worse way towards his country's trading partners--and this rhetoric can't fairly be blamed on his bad advisors since rhetoric is what Obama does so very well--then I'd have to agree with Nick's argument at The Invisible College that it could seem to the world as if the United States has systematically been making international trade agreements in bad faith for the past decade or two.

That appearance could be very bad for the United States. If the current Bush administration and a future Obama administration are seen at this point about equally as likely to tear up inconvenient international agreements, the main difference being in the type of agreements they would reject as inconvenient, what might this do to the United States' battered image in the world? And with the actual materialization of this spectre, what wouldn't happen to it?

Back in June 2006 and over at his Comment is free blog hosted by The Guardian, Timothy Garton Ash proposed that Canada would make an excellent new member-state for the European Union.

In most respects it would be a much easier fit than Ukraine, let alone Turkey. It effortlessly meets the EU's so-called Copenhagen criteria for membership, including democratic government, the rule of law, a well-regulated market economy and respect for minority rights (Canada's a world-leader on that). Canada is rich, so would be a much-needed net contributor to the European budget at a time when the EU has been taking in lots of poorer states. One of Europe's besetting weaknesses is disagreement between the British and the French, but on this the two historic rivals would instantly agree. English-speaking Canada would strengthen the Anglophone group in the EU, Quebec the Francophone.

Take the list of things that many Europeans consider to be most characteristic of us - by contrast with the United States. We Europeans believe that the free market should be tamed by values of social justice, solidarity and inclusiveness, realised through a strong welfare state. We don't have capital punishment. We believe that military force should only be used as a last resort and with the sanction of international law. We support international organisations. We love multilateralism and abhor unilateralism. We tend to think that men and women should be able to live more or less as they please with whomever they please, irrespective of gender and sexual orientation. We pride ourselves on our diversity. Check, check, check. Welcome to Canada.

From here, Ash goes on to argue that the values described as "European" (Nordic, Rhineland or Mediterranean models of capitalism, say, or certain kinds of social liberalism) are not exclusively Europeans, and are in fact shared by many people around the world, including "Americans in the liberal blue states of the US." After criticizing Canadians and Europeans alike for their alleged "obsession with the United States, and [their] distinguishing themselves from it, often by crude stereotyping," Ash goes on to suggest that non-American democracies should get their act together, stop punching below their weight, and start promoting the good elements of their social models, preferably in concert with other democracies. Whatever similarities exist with his arguments in his 2006 book Free World are probably quite intentional.

From The Globe and Mail, John Ibbitson's article "Clinton and Obama vow to reopen NAFTA".

Both Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton would withdraw the United States from the North American free trade agreement with six months notice after becoming president, unless the deal were completely renegotiated.

The Democrats made the commitment yesterday at the final debate before next Tuesday's Texas and Ohio primaries.

Both candidates have been highly critical of the trade deal, saying it has cost thousands of Americans their jobs.

Asked whether she would inform Canada and Mexico that the U.S. government was activating the six-month opt-out clause under which any country can leave the deal, Ms. Clinton replied: "I've said that I will renegotiate NAFTA, so obviously we'd have to say to Canada and Mexico that that's exactly what we're going to do; ... we will opt out of NAFTA unless we renegotiate it."

Ms. Clinton would demand new environmental and labour provisions as well as a new dispute-resolution mechanism, and she would eliminate the right of foreign firms to sue Washington for enacting measures to protect its workers.

All those demands would be negotiated with Canada and Mexico while the six-month opt-out clock ticked.

Talk of renegotiating an unfair and threatening NAFTA seems to be, in the United States' political lexicon, some sort of trope for an unfair and threatening economic relationship with the world in general, somewhat like free trade for some Canadians. Still. Is it wrong for me to be suspicious of the United States' willingness to renegotiate NAFTA fairly, especially with one partner that has a tenth of the United States' population and the other with a third of the United States' population and a third or so of the larger country's GDP per capita, both of these members being much more dependent on trade with the United States than vice versa, especially in light of the United States' demonstrated reluctance to abide by many of the rulings of the various tribunals involved in NAFTA?

Sean Gordon's article in The Sunday Star takes a look at a conference in Montréal where the idea of a common North American identity--américanité--was discussed. Américanite is a term that I'm familiar with from Québec, describing the somewhat controversial thesis that the Québécois (and other North American Francophones) are at least as much shaped by American influences as French influences, if not more. (This difference sometimes surprises French immigrants to Québec, as Fannie Gordon wrote last year.) This is the first time that I've heard about américanité being applied to the North America continent as a whole.

Is the conventional wisdom regarding U.S. cultural imperialism wrong? What if the "American" identity were being nudged toward a trans-national, continental one by the influence of Canadian and Mexican cultural factors?

French-language scholars in Quebec and elsewhere refer to it as "l'américanité," an idea that beyond national boundaries, linguistic differences and divergent histories, the countries of North America have forged a distinctive continental culture.

"Are we American? In my eyes, yes," said Université du Quebec à Montreal sociology professor Jean-Francois Côté. "But that's not the same thing as being United States-ian."

In research he presented to one of the conference workshops, Coté discerned a continental sensibility in a literary genre he identified as "travel literature" – the greatest exemplar of which is Jack Kerouac, the U.S.-born child of French-Canadians who penned the seminal On the Road.

"It began before NAFTA and has gone a long way beyond it in cultural terms," he said.

Côté cited the common thread that unites authors as varied as Russell Banks, Dany Laferriere, Octavio Paz and many others – themes such as solitude and nativism, a preoccupation with border narratives and the search for a broader identity.

"These are all ideas that put into question political borders," he said. "They have evolved into a cultural space that is no longer national ... there is an ongoing rediscovery of the Americas in literary terms."

Poet and author Emile Martel – the impromptu Spanish translator – also broached the subject of "l'américanité."

"The word American has strong resonance, both positive and negative, depending on your point of view. American-ness also allows for significant differences ... labels like Canadian or Québécois offer a sort of protection," he said, speaking in French.

Martel also suggested that national identities in North America are often invoked less out of profound difference than as a political reaction when a country's sensibilities are offended, such as Canada's by the George W. Bush administration.

"We create a moral wall called Canada, or better yet, a refuge called Quebec," he said. Points of differentiation like language, geography and history "help distinguish us without reducing our shared American-ness," he added.

American writer and urban-studies specialist Richard Florida has recently moved to Toronto and started a column in the Globe and Mail. His first column, "Wake up Toronto - you're bigger than you think" in today's edition, is worth reading for his suggestion that Toronto's future lies in its development into the nerve centre of a major transnational economic and social entity in the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence region.

What has happened is that the mega-city has become the nerve centre of one of the world's greatest mega- regions, a trans-border economic powerhouse that stretches from Buffalo to Quebec City. It's important to recognize this, because mega-regions have replaced the nation state as the economic drivers of the global economy.

A glimpse of this new reality came earlier this month when The Globe and Mail revealed that Canadian Football League owners were negotiating to bring an National Football League team to Toronto, and that the most likely and logical choice of available teams was the Buffalo Bills. The Bills are now seeking permission to play two games at the Rogers Centre next season. The move makes sense because the market for American-style football in Toronto is huge, but even more so when you think of the Buffalo-Toronto corridor in a way that was fashionable before 9/11 but has gone mostly unmentioned since: as a single economic entity – a mega-region, in other words.

[. . .]

These days, Toronto and the Greater Toronto Area are the economic success story. But, border or no border and heightened post-9/11 security notwithstanding, the two cities are effectively part of the same mega-region – let's call it Tor-Buff-Chester – with 22 million people and $530-billion in economic activity, making it the 12th-largest mega-region in the world and fifth-largest in North America.

[. . .]

According to our definition, mega-regions are made up of two or more contiguous cities and their surrounding suburbs, and generate more than $100-billion in annual economic output. Looked at this way, the mega-region centred in Toronto and Buffalo stretches to Guelph, Waterloo and London to the west, Ottawa, Montreal and Quebec City in the east, and includes Ithaca, Syracuse, Rochester and Utica in the United States. If I knew then what I know now, I might have given it the more accurate, if even clunkier, moniker “Tor-Buff-Loo-Mon-Tawa.”

In North America, only the mega-regions of Bos-Wash (Boston-New York-Washington), Chi-Pitts (running from Chicago through Pittsburgh), LA-San Diego-Tijuana, and Char-lanta (Charlotte through Atlanta) are larger. In the rest of the world, Tor-Buff-Chester is outflanked only by Greater London, Greater Tokyo, Osaka-Nagoya, Amsterdam-Antwerp-Brussels, Rome-Milan-Turin, Frankfurt-Stuttgart and Barcelona-Lyons.

It's interesting to see that Toronto's hinterland really might extend that far beyond Toronto proper, beyond even Canada's borders. Since at least the 1960s, Canadian journalists, sociologists, and others have been writing about the Quebec City-Windsor Corridor, a concentration of population, industry, and wealth that stretches from Windsor, Ontario in the southwest (just next to Detroit) northeast towards Québec City, and has Toronto very nearly dead-centre, with its importance rising since then with Montréal's relative decline. More recently than that, at least as earlier as my brief 2005 observation about the decline of the American cities of Detroit and Buffalo relative to Toronto, others have been suggesting that these and other cities might try to recover by linking with a luckier Toronto. I only hope that Toronto's up to the challenge.

UPDATE (11:11 PM) : Peter links to a Marginal Revolution discussion thread which, in turn, links to a 2007 City Journal| article that is very critical of Buffalo's prospects for revival.

UPDATE (30 October, 2:40 PM) : Richard Florida links to this post in a roundup of reactions to his Globe and Mail article.

The Globe and Mail was one Toronto news source among many that covered the Toronto segment of the Italian election campaign.

Vittorio Coco, a host on Toronto's multicultural CHIN radio station, is campaigning to become a senator.

His riding stretches from Cuba to Honduras, Guatemala and Mexico, up north to the United States and Canada. Among his constituents are as many as 137,000 Canadians, 5,000 people from the Dominican Republic and a lonely three in Saint-Pierre and Miquelon. The only thing these voters have in common is their Italian passports.

"I never imagined I'd be running for the Italian parliament," said Mr. Coco, a genial 66-year-old who wears a dark pinstripe suit and violet silk tie (Italian-made, of course). "Italians living abroad were classified as B citizens for years. This new law allowing us to be elected recognizes us as first-class citizens. Before when we screamed, no one listened in Rome. Now if we scream, they will have to listen."

Mr. Coco, who has lived in Canada since 1959, is running in Italy's national elections on April 9 in the new riding of North and Central America, where as many as 403,000 people are eligible to vote.

"It's kind of an experiment," he acknowledged over a risotto lunch at an Italian eatery in Toronto. A long-overdue experiment, he feels.

Italy's move to allow Italians living abroad to be represented in parliament took more than five decades to achieve. Italy had to change its constitution and then persuade dozens of other countries to let dual-Italian citizens living abroad stand as candidates and campaign through the Internet, e-mail, print mail and Italy's diplomatic network.

The decision to allow diaspora representatives to sit in the Italian parliament with full rights to engage in debates and vote on bills has been controversial both at home and abroad. Six senators and 12 deputies will represent the ridings of North and Central America (three seats); Europe (nine); South America (five) and Australia (one). That leaves 18 fewer parliamentarians for Italians who actually live in Italy.

I disagree with the suggestion could threaten Canadian sovereignty, since, as I read the issue, there won't be many critical conflicts between the Italian and Canadian states. It's not as if Little Italy or Corso Italia are going to become territories of debatable sovereignty. The Italian diaspora, though a substantially fictive diaspora, hammered together from different emigrant populations which left different regions at different times, does exist.

One issue that I can imagine is that where once this measure would have helped the Italian left, given the diaspora's origin in poverty and political oppression, the now-established and prosperous and older Italian communities are--as this thread at babble.ca suggests--likely to bolster the right. I've problems with this mainly because I doubt the competency and morality of the Italian right; others' mileage may vary. Another issue is that extending representation to the diaspora will, as the article notes, weaken the representation of the Italians living inside Italy. Another, more serious criticism is that extending the vote to the legally-constituted diaspora while people of immigrant stock in Italy itself are deprived undermines the relatively territorial basis for the Italian nation-state and instead imposes much more restrictive criteria for membership based on descent. If Italian-Canadians a generation removed can vote while a first-generation Romanian-Italian can not, there's problems.

Even so, none of these issues, not even the last, are quite enough for me to condemn this new law. Let's see how this works.